

ELECTORAL REFORM AND GRADUAL DEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICA:  
THE CASE OF GHANA

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ABSTRACT

This paper presents a case study of Ghana's gradual democratization in the 1990s through 2004. This gradual democratization in Ghana has come about as a result of three main factors: the role of the international community, civil society, and electoral reform. Data were obtained from secondary sources, but primary sources as well. The 1992 Constitution and Electoral Commission (EC) documents as well as relevant books were consulted, in addition to a survey and interviews with the Chairman of the EC and at one-time Chairman of the opposition People's National Convention Party (PNC). The focus of the paper was electoral reform. The study found that Ghana's gradual democratization was partly the result of substantial electoral reforms carried out by the EC, which hindered fraud, and boosted public acceptance of election results. This promoted political stability and contributed to Ghana's first electoral turnover in 2000. The hypothesis that the institutional creation and design of the EC and the electoral reforms it undertook after 1992 were essential, though not sufficient, for deepening democracy was borne out. Subsequent political opportunities in a negative direction such as a coup were prevented in Ghana, partly by virtue of electoral reforms undertaken by the EC. Although the EC was created to help facilitate the transition to democratic rule, it became independent of government and chose to embark upon electoral reforms that have furthered democratization in Ghana. Ghana's experience in this regard, it is recommended, should be emulated by sister African countries.

*Keywords:* Electoral Reform, Election Management, Africa, Ghana.

1. INTRODUCTION

Election management has become one of the most important prerequisites for successful democratization and for democratic consolidation. This is because an independent and impartial election management has been regarded as "essential in the transition to and consolidation of representative democracy" (Goodwin-Gill 1994: 42). Successful democratization is dependent upon the acceptability by the political players or stakeholders of the electoral process and election outcomes. In order for this to be achieved, the electoral body or machinery must be seen to be impartial and capable of performing its functions. Consequently, the importance and centrality of an impartial and trustworthy electoral body such as the EC is indispensable for Ghana's democratization process (Aye 1998: 53).

When the electoral machinery fails in its duty of facilitation of free and fair elections, the repercussion is the destruction of the public's faith in the whole concept of democratic

governance (Smith 1960). Nine indices of free and fair elections have been put forward as the framework through which to examine the Electoral Commission's (EC) role in the electoral process and electoral reform that took place after the 1992 general elections. These are: the electoral law and system; constituency delimitation; election management; the right to vote (franchise); voter registration; civic education and voter information; electoral campaigns including media access and coverage; balloting, monitoring, and results; and complaint and dispute resolution (Goodwin-Gill 1994: 27). These indices of free and fair elections facilitate an understanding of the EC's role in building confidence, consensus, and credibility in the Ghanaian electoral process in the post-transition period after 1992. In addition, they enable the identification of problems and challenges confronting the EC and the appropriate solutions to rectify these problems.

The first index of free and fair elections, the electoral law and system, consists of all the rules and procedures that are fashioned to govern the conduct of elections, including electoral districting, the form of candidacy, voting procedures, and the formula for converting votes into seats (Krennerich 1996: 7). Constituency delimitation, the second index, is defined as the demarcation of a country into several constituencies. This is important because "representation by population is as central to the concept of democracy as is the notion of equality of voting power" (Goodwin-Gill 1994: 33). Proper constituency delimitation leads to the enhancement of relative equality of citizen voting power, especially the power of the rural vote (Debrah 1998: 15). It also promotes effective representation and allows for the inclusion of community interests and minority representation.

The third index of free and fair elections is election management. Efficient election management is central to free and fair elections for several reasons. First, it helps to build trust, impartiality, and confidence in the electoral body. Second, it also encourages the creation of an election commission that becomes independent, non-partisan, and transparent, thereby creating an atmosphere of peace, credibility, self-respect, and enthusiasm among both candidates and voters. Problems of election management, however, arise out of a lack of credibility and competence of the electoral body or institution, as well as the attitude towards independent monitoring groups. Poor election management has often fuelled civil wars, instability, boycotts by losing parties and general insecurity in a given country (NDI 1990: 19). The fourth index, the right to vote or exercise franchise, is the political right of every adult citizen to vote and be voted for. Citizenship, age, and residency requirements are the basic determinants of the franchise, thus the right to vote is not absolute (Goodwin-Gill 1994: 42).

The Voter's Register, an official list of persons who are entitled to vote in an election to which the list relates (Smith 1960: 20), is a crucial feature of free and fair elections. The Voter's Register is designed to enable all qualified citizens to be included, to prevent electoral abuse and fraud by individuals, special interest groups, political parties and governments, and to be "widely accepted as an authoritative and legitimate means of cataloguing the electoral population and of settling disputes" (Courtney 1991: 1). The problems that plague the Voter's Register, however, include a failure to purge the names of the deceased, omission of names, double entries, and inconsistent registration of names (Smith 1960: 21). Civic education, the sixth index, refers to the whole process of inculcating democratic values in the adult population; it involves educating the electorate about their rights and responsibilities as citizens of a state (NDI 1996: 30).

The seventh index of free and fair elections, the electoral campaign, refers to all the activities directed at voters by all the contestants in an election. Goodwin-Gill (1994: 65) defines it as "the evolution of the process to polling day." Successful electoral campaigns depend on the following: first, a peaceful and tolerant human rights and election environment, free from intimidation, violence, and harassment. Second, accessibility of media coverage to all parties is essential. Blatant manipulation of the media by some incumbent governments (for example, the Rawlings-PNDC government in the 1992 electoral campaign) to enhance their

parties' and candidates' popularity at the expense of other parties more often is what obtains in Africa.

Balloting, monitoring, and results of elections are also important. The actual process of balloting is as crucial as all the pre-election activities. The process of balloting is completely intertwined with monitoring. The presence of party representatives, domestic and foreign monitoring groups is a check against errors, misconduct, and fraud, and their very presence limits opportunities for wrong-doing (Goodwin-Gill 1994: 73). Finally, the ninth index of free and fair elections involves complaint and dispute resolution. Complaints may revolve around human rights violations, discrimination against groups or particular candidates regarding the exercise of their franchise, or alleged violations of the laid down procedures. Generally, however, what is usually at issue is a challenge to the validity of the result (Goodwin-Gill 1994: 80). What is important is not so much the sanction but the timeliness of the response (Goodwin-Gill 1994: 80). The ideal situation is where the adjudicating body is neutral and impartial. Unfortunately, the apparent settlement delays of disputes have the potential to encourage tension, anarchy, and other forms of unrest (Debrah 1998: 23).

In this paper, an examination of the EC's role in Ghana's electoral process after 1992 will take place through the lens of five of the indices of free and fair elections enumerated above – the third index, election management; the fifth index, compilation or revision of the voter's register; the sixth index, civic/voter education; the eighth index, balloting, monitoring and result; and the ninth index, complaint and dispute resolution. The other four indices – the electoral law and system; constituency delimitation; the right to vote/franchise; and the election campaign, were not directly problematic for the 1992 elections and beyond.

The paper focuses on the EC's role and activities in the 1996 and 2000 general elections. This is because the reforms carried out after the 1992 disputed elections were crucial for the successful outcome and acceptance of the elections and results in 1996 and 2000. It is important to look at how the EC and electoral rules and changes worked on the ground in the first two elections after 1992 which were testing grounds for the success of the subsequent elections. The historical context from which the EC emerged is first discussed, in order to enhance understanding of how the EC became independent of government and a force for the furtherance of democracy. Prior to this, a brief exposition of the research methods used is given, as well as a short review of the current discourse on electoral reform in emerging democracies.

## 2. METHOD AND MATERIALS

Mostly secondary data have been used, interspersed with pertinent first-hand/primary information from a few interviews. The paper gleaned information from the 1992 Constitution of Ghana and Electoral Commission (EC) documents as well as relevant books on elections, election management and democracy. In addition to a relevant field survey conducted by the Department of Political Science at the University of Ghana, interviews with the Chairman of the EC and at one-time Chairman of the opposition People's National Convention Party (PNC) added valuable understanding of the nature of the electoral system and election management in Ghana. Thus, a qualitative research method was used overall, and this afforded acquisition of an in-depth knowledge and insight into the workings of the election management body in Ghana, as well as the nature and importance of electoral reforms for an incipient democracy.

### 2.1 THE DISCOURSE ON ELECTORAL REFORM IN EMERGING DEMOCRACIES

It has been argued in the literature on elections, electoral reform and democracy that the effectiveness of election management bodies (EMBs) as institutional linchpins of electoral governance depends largely, but not exclusively, on their autonomy from the government (Mozaffar 2002). However, electoral fraud continues to characterize the management of

elections in emerging democracies, producing large-scale protest and violence recently in Iran, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Zimbabwe. Fraud also threatens citizen perceptions of government legitimacy, making it less likely that people think it is worth their time to turn out and vote in the future (Long 2010).

In addition, due to lack of clarity on the causal links between elections and violence, policymakers may not have the information they need to ensure that elections help solve rather than instigate conflict. This information is vital because *post hoc* solutions to electoral violence (power-sharing, for example) have not proven fruitful and, in many cases, have been destabilizing. This it is very important to ensure the proper conduct of elections in the first instance (Long 2010).

Long (2010) suggests that the international community should re-focus on the important institutional components that are required for free and fair electoral processes, including the creation and maintenance of independent electoral commissions. Due to the fact that "all parties to an election may have incentives to cheat – especially when polling reveals that races are close – meaningfully independent and robust commissions serve as important third party guarantors that alleviate credibility problems between parties otherwise willing to resolve their disputes through extralegal means. Without this check, the uncertainty of outcomes in the shadow of elections makes all sides more likely to rig the process and spark violence" (Long 2010).

Several instances or aspects of electoral reform abound in the literature. A significant aspect of electoral reform is the nature and structure of the institutions engaged in the management of elections or in delivering electoral services. According to the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IIDEA 2006), these reforms "may enhance the independence of the EMB – for example the creation of independent model EMBs in countries such as Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Romania, and South Africa. Electoral responsibilities may be reassigned amongst existing and/or new bodies to promote better service delivery – as in New Zealand, Sweden, and the UK. In some cases, such as in Sweden, the suggestions for reform of electoral management were initiated by the EMB itself. In others, as in New Zealand and the UK, the reforms of electoral management were initiated by the government. Pressure from local civil society or international groups may also instigate reform of electoral management arrangements, as in Georgia and Liberia" (IIDEA 2006).

Key electoral issues may be targeted by local civil society groups, such as electoral participation and representation, delimitation of electoral districts, voter registration, registration and oversight of political parties, and enhancement of electoral integrity. They may also target specific technical or technological aspects of the electoral process, such as introducing new procurement or employment processes, voter registration systems, or voting and vote-counting methods or systems. They may involve social policies, such as reducing a gender imbalance in representation, improving access to electoral processes for marginalized sections of society, or improving the staff representativeness in the election management body (IIDEA 2006). The need to focus on issues of representation is often the result of a functional need, for example, of perceptions of an 'unfairness' in representation, or of government ineffectiveness or lack of responsiveness. Electoral system reform places a substantial information responsibility on the EMB, and may require it to implement new methods of electoral district boundary delimitation, voting, and vote counting (IIDEA 2006).

Worthy of note also is the fact that EMBs "can play a significant role in reform of electoral district boundary delimitation: as advocates of more transparent and equitable boundary delimitation processes; in providing expert opinions on boundary delimitation issues; and in ensuring that they exercise any responsibilities for boundary delimitation impartially, equitably, and with integrity" (IIDEA 2006). Some electoral reforms have introduced multi-member districts, which can make electoral boundaries less influential in the determination of election results. Other reforms "have introduced boundary delimitations based on 'one person, one vote, one value'. Some reforms have attempted to make boundary delimitation processes

more transparent and objective, such as by removing any role for the legislature in delimitation; having an independent body in charge of delimitation; and requiring open hearings and independent review of proposed boundaries" (IIDEA 2006).

The process of voter registration has attracted much attention in recent times in both emerging and established democracies. Voter registration determines the ability of eligible voters to participate in an election, and thus is a key component in the fairness of an election and if not conducted well could result in the disenfranchisement of some voters. It had been argued that because voter registration "generally occurs well before Election Day, and often outside the direct scrutiny of observers (especially where electoral registers are derived from civil or population registers), the internal integrity of voter registration systems needs to be very high. Reforms have targeted increasing the efficiency as well as the integrity of voter registration processes" (IIDEA 2006).

Significantly, "many EMBs have implemented systems to improve the inclusiveness, fairness, accuracy, and transparency of voter registration, such as providing for continuously updated voter registration, special registration provisions for transient voters, and safeguards against wrongful rejection of or removal from registration. Some EMBs and other agencies responsible for maintaining data from which voters registers are derived are improving the integrity of voter registers through better methods of checking the identity of qualified persons, and reducing data processing times, often using modern technological solutions" (IIDEA 2006), and this must be done by all EMBs worldwide as far as is possible. There is the need for EMBs to ensure that technological solutions for voter registration (such as biometric voter registration (my emphasis)) enjoy the trust of the citizens and are sustainable, especially in emerging democracies (IIDEA 2006).

While the current discourse on electoral reform in emerging democracies highlights and analyses many aspects of the scope of electoral reform, this paper specifically takes a look at the nitty-gritty of the electoral reforms undertaken in the emerging democracy example of Ghana. The discourse alludes very scantily to the importance of civil society and some EMBs themselves in pushing for and implementing electoral reforms in Ghana among other countries, but what this paper does is to flesh out what the process actually involved in Ghana, in order to throw more light on and enhance understanding of the issues confronting emerging democracies, especially regarding the quest for legitimate elections and the removal of conditions that can elicit violence during and after elections.

### 3. DISCUSSIONS

Despite the distrust of the INEC by political parties and some sections of the Ghanaian public in 1992, the creation of this institution by the Rawlings regime nevertheless represented a substantive move that resulted in a no-return to the days of military rule.

The performance of previous electoral bodies in Ghana gives clues as to the reasons for the cynical perception of the EC, in the first half of the 1990s, that political parties and some sections of the Ghanaian public had. Ghana has generally followed the practice of establishing an independent Electoral Commission (either sole electoral commissioners as in 1968, 1969-74, 1977, 1978, 1979-82, or a collective body as in 1982-1992, 1992, 1993), with the exception of 1950-1968 and 1974-1977 during which the electoral body was a department under the Ministry of Local Government (Ayee 1998: 54). This practice of establishing an independent Electoral Commission is regarded in many circles as an "important step in building traditions of independence and impartiality, and the confidence of the electorate and parties alike" (Goodwin-Gill 1994: 36).

Unfortunately, in spite of the institution of independent electoral commissions in Ghana, the public and political parties have doubted the impartiality, integrity, independence, and transparency of electoral bodies as well as non-governmental involvement in their decisions and

activities (Ayee 1998: 54); Thus, during the 1969 election in Ghana, for example, the opposition parties demanded a new voters' register and new elections. They also demanded the procurement of photographic equipment for identification of voters on the register (Crabbe 1975: 136-137).

Electoral bodies in Ghana have been almost perennially criticized and hounded by the government of the day. As some scholars have highlighted, in the March 30, 1978 Referendum on Union Government,<sup>1</sup> Justice I.K. Abban, the sole Electoral Commissioner, wrote to the Secretary of the Supreme Military Council (SMC) complaining about threats to his life and attempts to interfere with the selection of returning officers. On the day of the UNIGOV referendum, it was reported that Justice Abban had engaged in heated arguments with government officials on the matter of vote counting (Chazan and Le Vine 1979).

Similar allegations of government involvement and influence were leveled against the Rawlings-PNDC regime's National Commission for Democracy (NCD) (1982-1992) that oversaw the District Assembly elections in 1988/89, and the INEC that organized the referendum on the 1992 Constitution and the 1992 general elections. In contrast to the functions assigned to the 1969 and 1979 electoral bodies, the functions of the NCD transcended electoral ones to include political functions. For example, in addition to conducting public elections, it was further required to embark on political education and disseminate information on government policies. This suggests that the NCD was both an elected body and a political organ of the state (NCD Document 1991: 32).

This historical look at Ghana's electoral bodies must include an examination of the EC's relations with Rawlings, in order to highlight the 'negative perception' obstacle it had to overcome in order to gain credibility in the eyes of the public. Before and soon after the 1992 general elections that returned Ghana to multi-party civilian constitutional rule, the EC was perceived by the public and opposition political parties as being in league with the Rawlings government, due to INEC's creation by PNDC military decree, and alleged negligence or complicity of INEC that allowed massive rigging of election-day balloting and vote-counting (Commonwealth Secretariat 1992).

Contrary to this view and perception, the EC's chairman has insisted that the EC, even in the days of INEC, was independent, and experienced no interference even by the PNDC or NDC governments. He has attributed the opposition's woes to other factors, such as use of the 1988 voter's register. Ironically, it is precisely on this voter's register, and the fact that the EC went along with the PNDC law that mandated its use, that the opposition parties based their denunciation of the 1992 election results and argued the complicity and untrustworthiness of the EC.

This brief historical exposition of electoral bodies in Ghana demonstrates that despite the creation of separate institutions to manage and oversee electoral processes in Ghana, electoral bodies have not succeeded in procuring a clean image of fairness, independence of government, and impartiality. The governmental appointments of Electoral Commission members without opposition representation, as well as governmental attempts to influence the operations of electoral commissions have undermined and eroded their credibility as independent and impartial election management institutions (Ayee 1998: 57). The EC, however, largely succeeded in the 1990s, in removing this stigma that has long plagued electoral bodies in the post-independence period. The role of the Rawlings-PNDC-appointed INEC in the 1992 electoral period and process illustrates the initial negative perception of the electoral body as had been common in the Ghanaian polity and provides a background and further understanding of how the INEC, which became the EC, became independent and more positively perceived by Ghanaians.

<sup>1</sup> UNIGOV was a government of national unity composed of the army, police, and civilians proposed and pushed forward by the then military head of state, General I.K. Acheampong in an attempt to legitimize his rule.

The proposed transition from military rule to democracy raised the need for an electoral body to handle the transition process to constitutional rule. Thus, the Interim National Electoral Commission (INEC) was established by the PNDC government in 1991 to conduct the 1992 general elections. The Rawlings government appointed Justice Josiah Ofori-Boateng as chairman, and two deputies, Dr. Kwadwo Afari-Gyan (Operations) and Nana Oduro Numapau (Finance and Administration) of INEC (Debrah 1998: 55). Also in 1991, the District Elections Committees (DECs) were abolished and replaced by a team of District Returning Officers and deputies who represented INEC at the constituency level for the 1992 general elections (Afari-Gyan 1995: 7).

In 1991, the INEC was not independent of government; this was the perception of the public and opposition parties. The major reason for this was the unilateral PNDC government appointment of INEC members without consultation with other interested parties of the opposition. This was perceived as unhealthy for the transition process, and consequently attracted the attention of the Commonwealth Observer Group which monitored the 1992 elections. The Commonwealth Observer Group expressed regret that “the INEC had been filled without consultation, let alone agreement of the other parties” (Commonwealth Observer Group 1992: 40-42).

INEC subsequently came under heavy attack such that the opposition called for a “vote of no confidence in INEC” (The Statesman 1992: 1). It goes without saying that in a democratic transition and in the context of Ghana’s democracy aspirations, voter confidence would have been greatly boosted had opposition party or civil society representatives been included in the 1992 election administration. The INEC would also have been perceived as more transparent by the parties and the general public. A second reason for the INEC’s non-independence was the PNDC’s attempts to manipulate its operations – it successfully secured INEC’s use of the same flawed register from the 1988/89 district assembly elections. Thus, four of the political parties that contested the November 1992 presidential elections – the New Patriotic Party (NPP), the People’s National Convention (PNC), the National Independent Party (NIP), and the People’s Heritage Party (PHP), boycotted the December 1992 parliamentary elections because of the inability or unwillingness of the then-PNDC government to meet these three conditions: first, a transitional authority to supervise, among other things, the electoral process; second, a completely new voters’ register to be compiled and identity cards issued to voters; and third, the replacement of the INEC with a new commission whose members would include representatives of the competing political parties (Ayee 1996; Jeffries and Thomas 1993; Badu and Larvie 1996).

In spite of this, the Commonwealth Observer Group stated that INEC was slowly able to show impartiality. Two main types of evidence of partial independence of the INEC are as follows. First, it refused to register the EGLE party, which was supportive of the PNDC, and this refusal gave credence to its independence and non-partisan character (Goodwin-Gill 1994: 38). Another demonstration of INEC’s increasing credibility came when the INEC chairman publicly condemned Rawlings and the National Democratic Congress (NDC) party for use state vehicles to transport people and materials to the NDC congress at Cape Coast in September 1992. In an attempt to even the playing field, INEC arranged with the PNDC government for a pool of fifty government vehicles to be made available for equal use by all the contesting political parties (Commonwealth Secretariat 1992: 30). Furthermore, INEC energetically embarked on voter education, with the financial assistance of the Danish Development Agency (DANIDA) (Debrah 1998: 57).

INEC, in a bid to ensure that political parties understood the details of the electoral process, made copies of all instructions given to Presiding Officers and polling staff available to them in an effort to maximize the degree of their familiarity with the process and to assure maximum transparency (Commonwealth Secretariat 1992: 27-28).

Against the background of accusations of partiality, irregularity, and fraud that were made against the EC after the 1992 presidential elections, a number of changes in the electoral process were made by the EC in order to enhance the transparency of the 1996 elections and the legitimacy of its outcome. There was no major domestic or international pressure for the reforms to the electoral process; the improved activities and reforms have been initiated by the EC.<sup>2</sup> The 1996 reforms discussed below show a steady movement of the EC towards impartiality and independence of government.

First, a new voters' register was compiled with the active collaboration and participation of the political parties from October 1-15, 1995. By 1996, dialogue had increased between the EC and the political parties, and because the EC had been and is open to the political parties, when they have had problems they have come to the EC with them.<sup>3</sup> In fact, the voters' register for the 1992 elections had many technical irregularities, including an apparent larger than statistically possible number of registered voters; failure to purge the names of the deceased since 1987; double entries from software problems; and inconsistent registration of names. The new register had a voter population of 9,185,660 made up of 4.6 million men and 4.56 million women (Debrah 1998).

More than 89,000 party agents, four to a registration center – consisting of two from the government parties and two from the opposition parties – monitored the registration exercise in 19,000 polling stations. This was in contrast to the 1992 elections, where party agents were not allowed to monitor the voter registration exercise. All the party agents had the same training as the EC's registration officials in registration procedures, and records were kept of the number of persons that were registered daily (Ayee 1998: 61). A mechanism was put in place by the EC where those not qualified to register but had done so could be challenged. Anyone could bring a challenge against someone suspected of not qualifying to vote, and the person or persons challenged would have to appear before a District Review Committee, which would after investigation, make its decision. This mechanism helped ensure that most people registered in a very transparent manner. DANIDA and USAID were very helpful in the 1995 voter's registration administered by IFES, the EU, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, CIDA, and even China, which gave motorcycles and bikes.<sup>4</sup> The new register was accepted widely by the political parties as an authoritative and legitimate record of eligible voters. Thus, a major factor that undermined the legitimacy of the 1992 elections was removed. Appendix 1 provides a list of international donor assistance to the EC.

Second, voter identity cards were provided for every registered voter. The inadequacy of funding meant that only voters in the ten regional capitals and ten selected rural communities, about one-third of the voter population, received photo identity cards. The remaining number of people received thumb-printed cards. These ID cards also included the voter's polling station number, so that those who lost their way on the day of the elections could easily be directed to their polling stations (Ayee 1998).

Third, transparent ballot boxes were provided by the EC. The intention was to forestall allegation, suspicions, or fear of ballot boxes being pre-stuffed with already thumb-printed ballot papers before being sent to the polling stations. The provision of transparent boxes was a departure from the previous practice where opaque, wooden or metal boxes were used in elections, which elicited countless rumors and allegations regarding stuffed ballot boxes (Badu and Larvie 1996; Ayee 1998: 62). In contrast to 1992, in 1996, all ballot boxes were transported directly to the EC after being shown to and stamped by all the parties' agents.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Interview with EC Chairman, Dr. K. Afari-Gyan, August 25, 2003.

<sup>3</sup> Interview with EC Chairman, Dr. K. Afari-Gyan, August 25 and September 19, 2003.

<sup>4</sup> Interview with EC Chairman, Dr. K. Afari-Gyan, August 25, 2003.

<sup>5</sup> Interview with EC Chairman, Dr. K. Afari-Gyan, August 25, 2003.



A fourth change in the electoral process that was made by the EC had to do with the provision of cardboard voting screens. In previous elections, a voter usually went into a room alone to make his or her candidate choice before coming out to vote in public. Under this system, it was alleged that some voters concealed ballot papers on their bodies which they removed while alone in the room, folded together with the given ballot and dumped into the ballot box when they came out to vote. For the 1996 elections, however, a voting screen was erected on top of a table to protect the integrity of the ballot, so that both candidate choice and voting took place in the full view of the public (Ayee 1997a).

The fifth and highly significant change dealt with the vote counting and declaration of results. Unlike 1992, when votes were counted at constituency centers instead of right at the polling stations, in 1996, vote counting took place at each polling station immediately after the close of the polls under the supervision of the Presiding Officer, and witnessed by the general public. The number of ballots cast for each candidate was recorded on the Declaration of Results Form for each of the candidates. The Presiding Officer then signed this form, and then it was countersigned by each candidate's agent. The Presiding Officer publicly declared the election results at his or her polling station and gave a signed copy of the results to each agent to be given to the respective candidates (Badu and Larvie 1996; Ayee 1997a). In the case of a controversy over the vote count at a specific polling station which could not be resolved, the Returning Officer recounted the votes at the constituency center in the presence of the candidates' agents.

In the absence of a controversy, for the parliamentary elections, the Presiding Officer in each polling station in a constituency sent his or her results form to the Returning Officer at the constituency center. In the candidates' or their agents' presence, the Returning Officer then collated the votes received and recorded the total on a form. After doing this for each candidate, the Returning Officer signed the form, which was then countersigned by either the candidates or their agents. Then the Returning Officer publicly announced the results, declared the winner for the parliamentary elections and posted a copy of the results at a conspicuous place. The results were then sent to the District Electoral Officer (DEO) who forwarded them to the Regional Electoral Officer (REO), who then sent them to the Electoral Commission headquarters for scrutiny, certification, and confirmation (Badu and Larvie 1996; Ayee 1998). Significant for reducing fraud was the fact that by the time the results arrived at the EC headquarters, the public already knew the results and the winners, and the candidates and party agents were satisfied that the vote count was devoid of fraud, as it was done in the presence of the party agents who had to sign off on the results at the polling stations.

The vote counting procedure in 1996 was cumbersome, but it enabled the electorate to know well in advance the person elected to represent their constituency, before the results were received at the EC headquarters. This procedure, however, differed with the presidential elections. Here, while the electorate knew the winner in their constituency or region, the overall winner could only be declared when all the results from the 200 constituencies had arrived at the EC headquarters in Accra. Thus, the EC chairman was the Returning Officer for the presidential elections (Ayee 1998: 64). In fact, this vote counting procedure and the involvement of party agents demonstrates two important facts: first, that the EC rules actually did and do much more than increase public confidence in, and acceptance of, election results; they actually hindered/hinder fraud and made it much harder for any election official to engage in fraud at the polling stations. Second, it demonstrates the existence of an effective opposition to check the vote, and its capacity to staff 20,000 polling stations with about 60,000 party agents in the 1996 (and also 2000) elections suggests the overall capacity of the opposition in Ghana. This supports Ayee's (1998) and Bofo-Arthur's (1998) assertion of the relative strength of opposition parties in Ghana, only hindered by insufficient funding. The political parties' vigilance and capacity in the 1996 and 2000 elections support Allah-Mensah's contention that elections and the electoral process are not only important for democracy as a system of governance, but also for political

parties, for without these they cannot realize their aspirations (1998: 125) of attaining power or holding certain positions.

Worthy of note is thus where this vote counting procedure came from, or what its source was. After the 1992 disputed elections, this new more transparent vote counting procedure emerged from the IPAC negotiations on electoral rules with the EC (Ayee 1998), and was put in place effectively as both the EC and opposition political parties in particular were eager to deter fraud. This depicted further the EC's increasing independence and increased the public's and opposition's confidence in it.

The sixth change involved perhaps the most confidence-building measure undertaken by the Electoral Commission – the co-option of the political parties into the election management process itself through the Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC) established in March 1994, more than two years prior to the 1996 general elections. The IPAC was formed by the EC to interact with the parties and create a sense of involvement in the electoral process.<sup>6</sup> According to the EC Chairman, Dr. Kwadwo Afari-Gyan:

The IPAC meets with us (the EC) every last Thursday of each month, and we solicit their input and have a frank discussion of every aspect of the electoral process. As a result, the level of suspicion (of the political parties toward the EC) has been reduced. The IPAC even monitors ballot printing. Civil society has also become more involved in the electoral process. For example, the media has been given the right to report results even at the polling stations, at the constituencies, at regional stations, and at the Electoral Commission.<sup>7</sup>

IPAC, definitely an innovative mechanism, allowed political parties in Ghana to come together to discuss election preparations with the EC (Ayee 1998), but it played and still plays a purely advisory role.<sup>8</sup> This was an example of elites building consensus on the rules of the electoral game. Donor representatives of the USAID, the European Union, the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), the British Overseas Development Agency (ODA), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and the International Foundation of Electoral Systems (IFES) attended the IPAC meetings usually held behind closed doors (Ayee 1998: 64). A number of issues such as the holding of presidential and parliamentary elections on the same day and the use of transparent ballot boxes with numbered seals were discussed and approved through IPAC. These measures served to increase the confidence of voters and the opposition parties (Ayee 1998: 64).

Seventh, the EC performed well in the area of voter education. The EC joined with the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) to display posters nationwide, including voting instructions, encouraged people to exercise their franchise, and promoted democratic ideals of tolerance and peaceful political activity. Radio and television programs and booklets were widely distributed, targeting not just voters, but candidates and political parties as well (Ayee 1998). People were hired by the EC from within the localities and trained to go back and educate the people on the how to vote and how to register. In order to reduce mistakes by election officials on polling day, there were practice exercises before the actual polling day on what to do and forms to be filled.<sup>9</sup> In fact, this voter education carried out by the EC and NCCE partly accounted for the high voter turnout of 78.2 % at the 1996 elections, the highest for any competitive elections, as well as for the relatively low number of rejected votes – 111,108 out of the 7,256,882 valid votes (Ayee 1998: 65).

<sup>6</sup> Interview with EC Chairman, Dr. K. Afari-Gyan, August 25 and September 19, 2003.

<sup>7</sup> Interview with EC Chairman, Dr. K. Afari-Gyan, August 25 and September 19, 2003.

<sup>8</sup> Interview with EC Chairman, Dr. K. Afari-Gyan, August 25, 2003.

<sup>9</sup> Interview with EC Chairman, Dr. K. Afari-Gyan, August 25 and September 19, 2003.

Of importance to the perception of the elections as free and fair was the Code of Conduct for the political parties and their agents that was developed by the EC (Ayee 1998). This Code of Conduct informed the political parties of the conduct expected of them, their candidates and their agents during the election campaign and particularly on polling day. 60,000 parties or candidate agents were spread out at nearly every polling station, and they played crucial roles not only by monitoring the voting process in a given polling station throughout the day, but by signing the relevant reporting forms and reporting results per ballot box to their respective party leaders and candidates (Ayee 1998). This parallel vote tabulation system meant that each party had an independent report from each polling station to compare with the official results from the Electoral Commission (Garber and Cowan 1993). These measures were highly important in actually hindering fraud, and facilitated the increased positive environment and transparency of the 1996 elections. A ninth change in the 1996 election management process had to do with the financial support received by the EC from the donor community. According to the chairman of the EC:

The budget is the government's responsibility, and it has to fund the EC from the Consolidated Fund. When it cannot meet the budget, the EC goes looking for donors, but has to report all funding to the appropriate government ministry. The EC's funding does not affect its independence, though. Its funding is separate from development expenditure; the EC's function is a mandated electoral activity which the government of the day has to fund. The EC does not raise its own funds, and in fact, with regard to the last three elections (1992, 1996, and 2000) the donors, such as the EU, USAID, some German NGOs, and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, funded the EC more than the government itself.<sup>10</sup>

The EC thus owed much of its success to donor assistance; in this way, international donors have played a supportive role in Ghana's electoral processes. The new voter's register that was compiled in 1995, the provision of ID cards, transparent ballot boxes, cardboard voting screens, and print material for civic education and voter information were made possible by donor assistance (Ayee 1998). For example, the USAID spent more than U.S. \$ 6.5 million to purchase electronic communication, computer equipment, and technical assistance for the registration of voters and the exhibition of the voter's register. Such support came as part of the USAID's efforts to assist in getting a *Supporting the Electoral Process Program* in Ghana off the ground (Ayee 1998: 66).

Despite the successful management of the elections by the EC in 1996, there were still some irregularities and malpractices detected on polling day – threats and intimidation, delays in the commencement of voting, and shortage of voting materials such as ballot papers, stamp pad and indelible ink. Ayee (1998) highlights some weakness in the EC's management of the 1996 elections. This was a chaotic event at the EC's office at Kaneshie in Accra, where a crowd had besieged the office in protest of the issuance of photographs for voter ID cards on polling day, an example of the vigilance of the general public itself regarding election conduct. According to Ayee, the EC chairman explained at a conference several days later that:

The Commission had decided not to do anything that would disenfranchise any voter. It had therefore provided an opportunity for registered voters who had been issued with voter ID cards without

<sup>10</sup> Interview with EC Chairman, Dr. K. Afari-Gyan, August 25, 2003.

photographs to have new ID cards with their photographs issued at the EC's offices right up to polling day (Ayee 1998: 68).

Notwithstanding the few problems, the outcome of the EC's management, through reforms, of the 1996 elections was widely hailed as commendable. Thus, a direct result was the opposition's inability or lack of desire to contest the outcome of the 1996 elections. J. A. Kufuor of the Great Alliance, and Dr. E. N. Mahama of the People's National Convention (PNC), the two defeated presidential candidates, conceded defeat and congratulated J. J. Rawlings of the National Democratic Congress (NDC). J. A. Kufuor went further to assure Ghanaians that there would be no "Stolen Verdict" on the 1996 elections. He also admitted that the NDC and Rawlings had emerged as a potent "Third Force" in Ghanaian politics – a claim that was vehemently denied by the opposition before the 1996 elections (*The Ghanaian Chronicle*, December 28, 1996: 6-7).<sup>11</sup> Clearly, elite consensus had been reached on the desirability of democracy in Ghana, regardless of slight imperfections in the electoral process and some irregularities on polling day.

Additionally, it is significant that the international observers of the 1996 elections declared the elections free and transparent, an independent confirmation of the free and fair conduct of the elections. The 23-member Commonwealth Observer Group (1996: 3) noted that "this was a credible election which reflected the will of the people....We are deeply impressed with, and wish to commend the strong commitment of the people of Ghana to the democratic process." The OAU Observer Group (1996: 2-3) likewise commended Ghanaians on the "free and unobtrusive nature of campaigns which we witnessed. This was encouraging, and it impressed upon our delegation that Ghana was fast moving toward the path of freedom and democracy."

It is important to note that most Ghanaians, after 1996, have had faith in the EC to a large extent. This reflected the EC's impartiality and increasing independence. When Ghanaians were asked in a post-1996 election survey about their opinions of the EC's performance regarding the free and fair nature of the 1996 elections, more than 73.3% responded that the EC had performed creditably, while 15.5% answered no, and 11.2% said they did not know.<sup>12</sup> This study was corroborated by the 1997 International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) study on Public Opinion in Ghana: 53% of eligible voters thought the EC performed its mission "very well," while another 25% thought it performed "fairly well." About 13% did not know how well the EC performed its mission. 25% knew "a great deal" about the EC; 29% knew "a fair amount;" 24% knew "not very much;" and 12% knew "nothing at all" (McCarthy 1997). The surveys confirm, significantly, that EC reforms have not been in vain, and that the reforms have enhanced the public's feelings of trust and confidence in the electoral process.

The overriding concern of the Electoral Commission prior to the 2000 elections was to improve upon the quality of the electoral process and promote the widest possible participation of both contestants and voters in the organization and management of the elections (Debrah 2001). The EC has been able to assert its independence and neutrality and win public confidence in its ability to manage elections fairly by acting firmly and decisively on a number of 'test cases' where it was convinced that its position was lawful and reasonable. For example, the EC objected to an extension of the voter registration period in 1995, contrary to the Rawlings-NDC government position that favored an extension (Debrah 2001: 76); this constituted an example of the EC's independence from government.

<sup>11</sup> Traditionally, the other two main forces in Ghanaian politics had been the right-leaning Danquah-Busia political camp from which the opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP) emerged, and the left-leaning Nkrumahist camp from which the Convention People's Party (CPP) and the PNC as well as other smaller parties emerged.

<sup>12</sup> Department of Political Science Survey, University of Ghana 8-22 December, 1996.

### 3.1 EC CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES FOR THE 2000 ELECTIONS

In order to foster complete public confidence in the electoral process and enhance its image of competence, independence, and fairness, the EC took a number of quick steps to ensure an improved electoral process in 2000. The first step was to help make the playing field more even than in 1996, by encouraging non-discrimination, freedom of speech, adequate media coverage, inter-party recognition, and fair opportunities for all parties with regard to equal access to funding and logistics (Goodwin-Gill 1994; Dundas 1994; Debrah 1998; Ayee 1998). To this end, the EC initiated a draft of a new Political Parties Bill to replace the Political Parties Law 1992 (PNDCL 281), perceived to inhibit fair play. The new Political Parties Act 2000 (Act 574) sought to revise the previous Political Parties Law for the purpose of bringing its provisions in line with those of the 1992 Constitution. Significantly, this Act removed restrictions on party member contributions and a compelling provision that mandated political parties' submission of their returns and accounts to the EC for verification and auditing (Political Parties Law 2000: 10).

For the 2000 elections also, an eight-page Code of Conduct document for political parties was launched to address issues of previous elections. The political parties developed the Code themselves and gave it to the Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC). This Code of Conduct was however only morally binding, and not legally binding.<sup>13</sup> The EC impressed upon the political parties the need to recognize the fact that "peace, public order, freedom of political campaigning, and compliance with electoral laws and regulations are essential to the conduct of free, fair, and credible elections and ready acceptance of election results" (Code of Conduct for Political Parties 2000: 3). By signing the Code, the parties bound themselves to work towards peace, tranquility, and clean elections (Debrah 2001).

Thus, a reasonable level of collaboration between the political parties and the EC has replaced the antagonism and suspicion that the political parties previously had with respect to the EC. Voter turnout has been high in presidential and parliamentary elections, but not as high in local elections where too many are elected at a time (for example, about 5000 District Assembly representatives).<sup>14</sup>

A third step taken by the EC was its collaboration with the National Media Commission (NMC) and the Ghana Journalists Association (GJA) in designing a framework for fair coverage and broadcast of parties' programs and activities. This effort yielded a positive outcome as the state-owned media carried party messages especially during the last month of the election campaign in October 2000.

Fourth, to foster an environment of a violence-free election campaign, the EC partnered with the security forces to form the Electoral Security Taskforce (ESTF) which had only a "peace-keeping" role. The role of the security forces in enhancing the integrity of the electoral process is, however, regarded with suspicion in many emerging democracies (Dundas 1994: 43). In Ghana, popular fears of the involvement of armed forces in the electoral process abound, because of past coercion and intimidation during military rule. The EC's ESTF excluded the army, however. In 2000, the Taskforce was deployed to protect candidates during their campaigns, and it also maintained law, order, and peace during and after the polls (Debrah 2001: 78).

To foster transparency in the 2000 elections, the EC Chairman, while rejecting the inclusion of party representatives as EC members, favored the involvement of party agents in several election tasks and functions. Significantly, he sought the parties' cooperation in recruiting election officials. Allowing political parties this role in helping to select election officials was designed to "purge the system of persons of doubtful credentials to work in the

<sup>13</sup> Interview with EC Chairman, Dr. K. Afari-Gyan, August 25 and September 19, 2003.

<sup>14</sup> Interview with EC Chairman, Dr. K. Afari-Gyan, August 25 and September 19, 2003.

electoral process. The main category of undesirable people in this regard was that of political activists” (Dundas 1994: 44). The parties provided background information in this regard to avoid the selection of unsuitable persons, and they could also raise objections to the appointment of election officials thought to be partial and non-neutral.

The EC continued the practice of consultation with political parties on key electoral process areas through the IPAC as part of the EC’s open-door policy regarding management of the 2000 elections. The IPAC forum provided the EC opportunities to address the concerns, grievances, and apprehensions of the political parties and to allay their fears and doubts (Debrah 2001: 78-79). Commendable was the EC’s policy of quick response to complaints made by individuals and political parties. Under a new procedure, complaints were classified upon receipt into categories of immediate, priority, and urgent. The EC Chairman, in some cases, convened the full Commission to consider some complaints and took action on them. The image of the EC was enhanced as this procedure was widely applauded by most of the parties. To further enhance transparency in the electoral process, transparent ballot boxes and table-top cardboard voting screens were used as in 1996, as a check against possible electoral fraud (Debrah 2001: 79).

To enhance the transparency of the 2000 elections, the EC gave accreditation to political party agents to witness the revision of the voter’s register from May 6-15, 2000. These agents were to act as the “eyes and ears” of their respective parties in evaluating the efficiency or inefficiency of the execution of EC officials’ tasks, monitoring their conduct in administering the rules and regulations for the revision of the register, and reporting on any irregularities. The party agents actively monitored every stage of the election process in 2000, especially the voting and counting of ballots, collation, declaration, and verification of results from the polling stations to the headquarters of the EC where the final results were declared (Debrah 2001: 80).

The biggest test of competence and fairness for the EC was the compilation of a credible voter register. The EC, in accordance with Section 26 of the Constitutional Instrument 12, which mandates the Commission to revise the register annually, designed a comprehensive program to revise the voter’s register. This revision exercise was undertaken to capture data on persons who had attained the legal voting age of 18, those who had not been previously able to register, and delete the names of the deceased (Debrah 2001: 81). The EC was able to fulfill a basic requirement of a satisfactory register that puts emphasis on the inclusion of all reliable estimated prospective voters in an election (Dundas 1994: 40). Voters who had moved since the previous elections could also apply for permanent transfer of their votes to their new address. More than 120,000 names were removed from the register while some 1,376,638 new voters were added.

Despite the fact that there was some doubt from the EC, political parties, and voters as to the 10.96 million registered voters in 2000 – comprised of 6.4 million men and 4.56 million women – the register was accepted subsequently as the legitimate and authoritative list of voters entitled to vote in the 2000 elections (Debrah 2001: 81). To reduce the phenomenon of multiple voting, voter identification cards with photographs were issued to prospective voters over a period of three months. The idea was to replace the thumb-print ID cards that some people still had from the 1996 elections. Ultimately, in spite of the Supreme Court ruling that both photo and thumb-print ID cards should be used on polling day, as many as 92.6% of the electorate voted with photo ID cards, while only 3.9% of the electorate voted with a thumb-print ID cards (National Survey 2001: 22), a big improvement over 1996.

As in 1996, the EC worked hard to educate the voter not only by familiarizing him or her with the voting mechanisms, but also by providing basic information about the elections process to almost every corner of the country. The EC’s overarching goal was to ensure that voters comprehended their voting rights and became sufficiently knowledgeable to make informed choices. It therefore hired community public educators who targeted voters in churches, markets, and at other social gatherings (Debrah 2001: 82; Debrah 1998: 93).

Finally, safeguarding the polls through the secrecy of voting and a fair counting process were the EC's principal concerns of polling day in 2000. The polls were opened at 7am and closed at 5pm at the behest of the EC in order to allow ample time for voters to cast their ballots. Polling booths were sited so that voters did not have to travel more than 5 kilometers to cast their ballots (Debrah 2001). The voting and counting procedures were the same as in the 1996 general elections. The arrangements allowed political parties to make their own parallel tabulations to check the EC's officially declared the results, and to prevent manipulation of results in the districts, regions, and at the EC headquarters. These measures were all designed to enhance the transparency of the process, and the vote counting method ensured that the intentions of voters were taken into full account. The number of spoiled ballots was at a minimum, and the party and candidate agents were satisfied that every polling activity fell within the applicable rules (Debrah 2001: 8).

The EC had become independent of government due to the above additional reforms, which culminated with a change in the governing party – the crucial electoral turnover test was passed. This provides strong evidence of the EC's independence, as it shows that it did not manufacture results to help the Rawlings' NDC party remain in power. Thus, the EC was able to regain and build upon public confidence in its abilities and most importantly in the electoral process. Such confidence in, and credibility of, the electoral process is essential for the acceptance of elections by losing parties and the general public, and for the deepening of democracy in Ghana. Where elections are perceived as rigged or botched and therefore illegitimate, although the holding of elections does not a democracy make, hindrances are in place against the deepening of democracy where multiparty competition and the representative function of leaders mistrust by the public as a whole. In this vein, the Electoral Commission of 1993 contributed towards restoring public trust in the Ghanaian electoral process since 1996.

#### 4. CONCLUSION

This paper has shown that a competent, dedicated, and impartial group of persons in a well-organized independent electoral management body is essential for the conduction of free, fair, and transparent elections, and therefore, for furthering democratization. The enjoyment of the electoral body of respect and broadest possible support from the general public (Ayee 1998: 72) is a plus for the smooth running of elections and for a peaceful aftermath. The reforms that were undertaken to improve the 1996 and 2000 electoral processes in Ghana showed that the EC as well as the political parties and political elite had learned important lessons from the 1992 election process. These changes or reforms were made in collaboration with the political parties and donors, and showed that “years of serious planning before an election are crucial and critical to its success” (Ayee 1998: 73). In Ghana, the reforms in electoral administration served to address the majority of the opposition's concerns regarding the 1992 elections, and “gave the government and opposition enough opportunity to devote their energies and attention to campaigning and building their party organizational structures” (Ayee 1998: 73).

Morrison's (2004) contention that “a strong EC and robust media have added managerial heft and extensive public exposure” and that on balance, democratic consolidation processes are well along, supports our argument and conclusion about the important role of the EC and electoral institutions. Overall, the Ghanaian evidence supports Ayee's (1998) and Goodwin-Gill's (1994) contention that impartial and independent electoral bodies are highly important for democracy and its consolidation prospects.

The Ghanaian evidence also buttresses the argument made by Mozaffar (2002) that the effectiveness of the EMB in emerging democracies and even in established ones depended largely on its autonomy from government. The EC in the Ghanaian case seemed to come of age by the 1996 elections and gradually carved a relative autonomy from government for itself by the 2000 general elections. Long's (2010) insistence that independent robust impartial EMBs are

necessary as third parties and arbiters to reduce fraud and the temptation from all sides - the opposition or the government - to rig elections is resounded in the Ghanaian case, where the EC stepped up with electoral reforms after the flawed elections in 1992 and gradually gained a reputation for itself as a largely impartial and robust arbiter in elections.

The evidence suggests, also, that it was not purely civil society that was working to enhance the electoral process but that the opposition parties, working from below, showed capacity and effectiveness by virtue of their agents' presence at polling stations and during the vote counting in 1996 and 2000. This phenomenon of partisan but more dedicated opposition parties making sure that election rules functioned properly demonstrates that there is sometimes an overlap between partisan opposition parties and civil society in Ghana during elections and sometimes between elections during demonstrations. This bodes well for democracy in Ghana, as it depicts a vigorous society working outside of the state to ensure responsiveness and accountability.

Finally, the EMB in Ghana, the Electoral Commission (EC), initiated electoral reforms after the disputed 1992 general elections with the consent and collaboration of political parties and civil society. In this case, and as pointed out (above) by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2006) as one of the possible scenarios, it was not the government of Ghana that initiated electoral reforms, but the EMB and other non-government actors. Ghana's EC played some of the significant roles in electoral reform highlighted by the International IDEA (2006), such as injecting fairness, accuracy and representativeness in voter registration as well as transparency in the balloting and monitoring of the result; these were very instrumental in minimizing fraud, preventing post-election conflict and violence and enhancing the legitimacy of the elections and the democratic process in Ghana.

Other African countries can learn from the Ghanaian experience of the importance of consistent and impartial electoral reform for elections. If such electoral reform initiatives are undertaken with the support of a strong civil society dedicated to democracy, then perhaps the incidents of disputed and flawed elections (Kenya, Zimbabwe, La Cote d'Ivoire, and Nigeria in 2007, 2008, 2010, and 2011 respectively) that often lead to conflict and stalemate will be minimized. While elections do not a democracy make, in Africa, peaceful and transparent elections that are accepted by all major stakeholders are a prerequisite for the onward march of democracy.

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#### Interviews

Interview with EC Chairman, Dr. K. Afari-Gyan, August 25 and September 19, 2003

## APPENDIX 1:

## Donor Assistance to Electoral Commission for 1996 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections

COUNTRY	VALUE OF ASSISTANCE	NATURE OF ASSISTANCE
1. U.S.A.	US \$6.5 Million	Purchase of election commodity, computer equipment and Technical Assistance for registration of voters, exhibition of voters registers, and elections.
2. Denmark	US \$3 Million	The Danish government provided forty-one thousand transparent ballot boxes, training for registration staff, training for exhibition staff, training for polling staff, and political party agents during the registration, exhibition of voters' registers, and elections. The fund will also enable the Commission to mount a voter awareness program to educate voters on the electoral processes.
3. United Kingdom	US \$800,000 (500,000 pounds)*	Provision of six OMR scanning machines to scan voter personal data on registration form. Assistance also provided for voter registration forms for ten million potential voters for recording of personal data.
4. Canada	US \$745,000 (One million Canadian dollars)	Purchase of paper for printing of ballot paper; provision of voting screens, tamper evident envelopes for conveyance of election documents.
5. European Union	US \$500,000	The assistance enabled the Commission purchase a 500 KVA Standby generating set to offset power outages in times of printing voter register and other works. Funds further enabled Commission to print educational posters for the exhibition of voters registers and training manuals for election staff.
6. UNDP	US \$275,000	Communication Equipment.
7. Germany	US \$185,000 (DM 280,000)*	The German government provided twenty-three HP radio sets for use in some district offices without communication facilities to facilitate communication.
8. Netherlands	US \$164,000	Printing of election materials.
9. Friedrich Ebert Foundation	US \$79,000 (DM 120,000)*	Training for media personnel, theater performance, video production on electoral rules, and publications.
10. China	US \$57,000	Provided twenty motor bikes for operation in difficult terrain where there are no motorable roads. The motor bikes would be used to convey personnel and materials during the election period in these areas.

Source: Electoral Commission. \* Conversion rates based on average Inter-Bank Exchange Rates for 25<sup>th</sup> October, 1996.

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